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Abstract
The insurance as governance literature focuses on the ability of private enterprises to collectively regulate, pool, and distribute
risks. This paper analyzes how governments support insurance markets to maintain insurability and limit risks to society. We
propose a new conceptual framework grouping government interventions into three dimensions: regulation of risky activity,
public investment in risk reduction, and co-insurance. We apply this framework to six case studies, describing insurance markets’ reliance on public support in more analytically precise terms. We analyze how mature insurance markets overcame
insurability challenges akin to those currently presented by extortive cybercrime. Private governance struggled when markets
grew too big for informal coordination or when (tail) risks escalated. Government interventions vary widely. Some governments prioritize supporting economic activity while others concentrate on containing risks. Governments also choose between
risk reduction and ex post socialization of losses. We apply these insights to the market for ransomware insurance, discussing
the merits and potential hazards of current proposals for government intervention.
Keywords: insurance, public/private partnership, ransomware, regulation, self-governance.

1. Introduction
A growing body of sociolegal research analyzes the governance functions of insurance (Baker, 2010; Ericson
et al., 2003; Herr, 2021). Building on the foundational research of Heimer (1985), scholars and policymakers
increasingly recognize that insurance not only pools and shifts risks, but also manages and reduces risks by regulating risk-taking behavior (Abraham & Schwarcz, 2023; Ben-Shahar & Logue, 2012). Governance by insurers is a
rational response to the twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Heimer, 1985). Insurers manage
adverse selection by screening applicants for their risk exposure, and they manage their applicants’ moral hazard
through conditionality, incentives, limits, and exclusions (Heimer, 1985). Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2022)
highlight a further problem for insurers: third-party moral hazard. Here, criminals target the insured to tap into
generous insurance-funded pay-outs or service providers inﬂate bills covered by insurers. Insurers, therefore, also
monitor and reduce opportunities for third parties to cause or exaggerate losses. Shortland (2019) analyzes the
sophisticated remedies to reduce third-party moral hazard in kidnap for ransom insurance: making it difﬁcult to
discover the insurance relationship, turning the insured into hard targets through security advice and training,
and reducing the proﬁtability of kidnaps by taking control of ransom negotiations.
Ben-Shahar and Logue (2012) and O’Malley (1991) argue that in some areas, insurers may have signiﬁcant
advantages over governments in the regulation of safety. That line of research may suggest why we observe a palpable sense of disappointment that cyber-insurance has failed to provide effective governance in the current
“ransomware epidemic” (Logue & Shnidermann, 2022; Talesh & Cunningham, 2021; Wolff, 2022). Ransomware
insurance may even increase risks by funding ever-increasing ransom demands, facilitating, and normalizing payments to criminal groups, thereby generating more demand for insurance and hence premium income
Correspondence: Anja Shortland, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London
WC2B 6NR, UK. Email: anja.shortland@kcl.ac.uk
Accepted for publication 22 October 2022.
© 2022 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

17485991, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12505 by University Of Pennsylvania, Wiley Online Library on [19/12/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

Regulation & Governance (2022)

THE GOVERNMENT BEHIND INSURANCE GOVERNANCE

(Dudley, 2019). According to this line of reasoning, it would be in the public interest to tightly regulate or even
ban ransomware insurance (Logue & Shnidermann, 2022).
By contrast, liberal scholars and industry insiders expect the market to develop private solutions to reduce the
incidence and severity of cybercrime (Lubin, 2021a; Ransomware Task force, 2021). Immature insurance markets
countering a dynamic threat are bound to have teething troubles. It is hardly surprising that many insurers
underestimated cyber risks. Claims have spiraled due to signiﬁcant criminal innovations, among them the
increasingly sophisticated industrial organization of cybercrime (Lusthaus, 2018), the use of exﬁltrated data to
drive up ransoms (Coveware, 2021), and criminals sheltering in countries unwilling to extradite them
(Kay, 2021). Shifting criminal threats require the adaptation of security and resilience-enhancing strategies
(Beaman et al., 2021). It then takes time for the evolutionary competition in private governance systems to select
superior solutions and create resilient institutions (Ostrom, 2010). Interrupting that process with public regulation could have the unintended consequence of preventing or stiﬂing innovation (Lubin, 2021b).
The question thus arises whether calls for government action should be heeded at this stage and, if so, what
form such intervention should take. This situation presents an opportunity to take a fresh look at public and private governance in insurance markets. In this paper, we present a new conceptual framework for analyzing the
relationship between governments and insurance markets. We take the presence of traditional insurance regulation, such as licensing, safety and soundness regulation, market conduct regulation, and contract enforcement as
a given. This type of regulation is essential to ensure the functioning of insurance markets and has been studied
in detail (e.g., Schwarcz, 2015). The contribution of this paper is to explore how governments can—in addition—
inﬂuence or shift the risks created by the insured economic activities. We classify and examine such government
interventions in three dimensions: regulation of risk-taking, public investment, and co-insurance. We apply this
framework to six mature insurance markets to describe their reliance on public support in more analytically precise terms and to analyze how they overcame serious viability challenges akin to those currently presented by
extortive cybercrime.
Our three-dimensional framework reveals distinct regimes in different insurance markets, ranging from
mostly privately regulated (K&R) to largely publicly governed (aviation terrorism risks, environmental liabilities).
We ﬁnd that private governance regimes can erode in fast-growing markets and can break down when risks suddenly escalate. When risks become (temporarily) uninsurable, governments support private insurance markets in
different ways. Some prioritize supporting economic activity while others concentrate on containing risks to society. Governments also face choices between ex ante risk reduction and ex post socialization of losses. Our analysis
suggests that some politically attractive short-term interventions impose longer-run costs on societies. The public
interest may be served better if government intervention is designed to support rather than stiﬂe self-protection
and innovation.
2. A three-dimensional framework of government intervention
One deﬁnition of an efﬁcient insurance market is that all stakeholders mutually satisfy their interests (Pal
et al., 2021). When insureds can inﬂuence the frequency or severity of loss, insurers may require them to reduce
risks that are within their control. Appropriate self-protection makes insurance sustainable and satisﬁes the policy
objective that insurance facilitate private enterprise without raising the overall level of risk to society. However,
when insurers compete for large-scale business, customers have market power. Brokers push insurers to compete
on terms and conditions as well as price. Competition on terms prevents insurers from being excessively cautious.
This is important, because insurance exists to “liberate” economic activity rather than choking off socially desirable activities through costly conditionality (Baker & Shortland, 2022a; Ewald, 1991). Yet, competition can also
lead to sub-optimal safety standards. If so, both insurers and society face a higher than optimal level of risk.
In these cases, insurance products can be made more proﬁtable through collective action. Insurers may, for
example, agree to impose minimum standards of self-protection. Insurers may also collectively reduce the level of
risk faced by their customers. For example, in 1833 t private insurance companies created the London Fire Engine
Establishment. They had realized that (a) it was cheaper to put out ﬁres than to rebuild houses, and (b) that
major conﬂagrations could be prevented if ﬁres were put out by the closest-available ﬁreﬁghters rather than
waiting for the responsible insurer’s brigade to arrive. London insurers thus created an integrated ﬁre service
2
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FIGURE 1 Three-dimensional framework

(Zurich, 2020). If collective action is unsuccessful or only partially successful, insurers act individually by reducing the amount of cover they provide. When the insureds bear higher risks, they may behave more carefully, but
socially desirable activities may not be undertaken.
We classify the main ways in which governments support insurance markets to reduce insured risks into
three categories. First, governments can create safety standards for the underlying insured economic activity
through formal regulation. In this case, suitable (levels of) security measures are speciﬁed and perhaps ofﬁcially
certiﬁed, and their adoption can be encouraged or mandated by the state. State involvement in standard-setting
and regulation thus occurs at different intensities. We indicate this on the y-axis of our framework as shown in
Figure 1. At the lower end of the y-axis governments merely support the creation of private security standards,
for example, by mandating that incidents are reported and publishing that information. Governments may also
create public standards to increase transparency about business practices—for example, the fuel economy standard system in the US.1 Companies choose the standard they want to operate at, and customers and insurers take
this into account when deciding whether to do business with them. At the highest intensity, safety standards are
made mandatory.
Second, government can invest public funds to reduce risk. They can fund public infrastructure or services
that reduce risk directly, and they can provide grants or other incentives to private organizations to reduce their
risk. (Insurers may further encourage such investments by reducing the premium to reﬂect the lowered risk
[Kuhnreuter, 2019].) Governments can also invest indirectly by funding enforcement actions, whether against
threat actors or against ﬁrms that fail to comply with the standards set by regulation. While governments generally ﬁnance enforcement efforts, there are many examples of successful co-funding. Government can create private rights of action that recruit private parties to serve as legal enforcers, with the resources of the state coming
primarily in the form of the court system (Burbank et al., 2013), and private ﬁrms can contribute to public efforts
to reduce threats. The latter occurs routinely when private actors fund the suits that enforce private rights of
action. Private actors also sometimes fund public enforcement. For example, British ﬁnancial institutions co-fund
a Dedicated Card and Crime Unit within London’s Metropolitan Police to tackle card, check, and payment
fraud.2 Who bears what percentage of the cost, and the desired level of provision are negotiated between stakeholders. We examine the intensity of public investment risk reduction on the z-axis.
Third, governments can co-insure risks. Co-insurance arrangements can be explicit or implicit and, again,
intervention can happen at different intensities. States can directly provide services for individuals who are unable
to access private insurance (e.g., state medical facilities). Governments can provide disaster relief for the
uninsured and under-insured, for example, after ﬂoods or riots, at varying levels of generosity. Governments may
© 2022 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.
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also be residual risk bearers: for example, when the responsible parties lack sufﬁcient assets to fulﬁll their obligations under liability regimes, as can occur in the case of environmental damage, when governments bail out companies to prevent systemic risk to the economy, or when governments provide guarantee funds when insurers go
insolvent (Moss, 2004). States tend to insure catastrophic risks that would bankrupt private insurance companies
and for which private reinsurance markets fail to develop—such as terrorism, war, and major natural disasters.
Even when markets could theoretically deal with tail risks, private insurance may be more expensive than the private beneﬁt from undertaking an activity. In these cases, governments may support a sector through publicly provided (re)insurance. At the extreme end of our x-axis, private insurance no longer exists, because the economic
activity is state-owned and state-run.
The importance of government action for private insurance markets helps explain why insurers are so active
in lobbying governments. While some lobbying may well represent the rent-seeking behavior commonly
assumed, other lobbying represents a form of collective action that creates and preserves sustainable insurance
markets. For example, in 1865—after several years of intense pressure by insurers—the public-sector Metropolitan Fire Brigade replaced the private London Fire Engine Establishment. This is widely regarded as a public policy achievement for the public at large as well as the insurance industry (Zurich, 2020).
We place the levels of government activity on these axes in our case studies at low, medium, and high based
on the ﬁnancial and legislative resources committed by governments. Thus, along the regulation dimension: a
court recognizing a private standard as a standard of care for tort liability that helps to manage moral hazard is a
low intervention; a government agency certifying a private standard is a medium intervention; creating a public
standard requires yet higher government effort and a government agency mandating a standard is a high intensity intervention. On the investment dimension: providing a basic public (court) infrastructure for private entities
to sue those whose have harmed them is a low intervention; government investment in risk reduction infrastructure and in policing and enforcement can be medium to high interventions depending on intensity; and government funding of private risk reduction and private funding of government enforcement are medium
interventions. On the co-insurance dimension: the lowest intervention category is implicit rather than explicit
insurance and only for residual risk; the highest intervention is explicit insurance for all risk arising from speciﬁc
activity; and a medium intervention would be something between those poles, such as discretionary, after-the-fact
disaster relief or explicit insurance with a high attachment point or partial coverage.
As should be clear, we do not have a measuring stick or an algorithm. Our goals for this article do not require
the precision that a claim to possess either tool would imply. We use the concept of three “dimensions” and the
resulting charts that we present for the ﬁrst case studies as a visual metaphor that illustrates the range and variation of government involvement in tricky insurance markets. In the analysis section below, we present a table that
classiﬁes government activity in each of the case studies in a fashion that could be used to generate similar charts
for each of the cases studies and the variations within them.

3. Case studies
In this section, we study government involvement in six insurance markets that faced serious viability problems
in the past. In all our cases, the economic activity in question would not be undertaken at socially optimal levels
without the availability of affordable insurance. If companies operate without insurance they could be bankrupted
by extreme losses, with society bearing the residual cost. We selected insurance products where customers have
signiﬁcant market power to resist command-and-control style governance by insurers and where the cost of signiﬁcant risk-reduction or self-defense is understood to be greater than the premium rebate that insurers can offer
to cautious customers. Therefore, insurers can only drive safety improvements when competition on security conditions is restricted.
We do not claim that these six case studies provide the optimal comparison or learning set for the
ransomware insurance market. However, they do provide good illustrations of the three-dimensional framework
and each case study illuminates one or more challenges that ransomware insurance currently faces: balancing the
desire of customers to recover staff or assets safely and quickly against the danger of incentivizing crime, managing moral hazard, and extreme tail risks.
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3.1. Art theft insurance
The art price boom of the 1980s expanded the demand for insurance while putting the insurability of top-end art
into question. Art theft was relatively easy and increasingly proﬁtable. Insurers struggled to encourage their customers to properly secure their collections: high-end safety interferes with sharing and enjoying art. Mostly, stolen and looted art circulated freely in the art market. Well-known objects that were too hot to fence could be
ransomed back to their original owners (Shortland, 2021). Insurers had to act fast to reverse rising losses. Offering partial insurance, that is, insuring objects for a fraction of their market value, encouraged better self-protection. However, insurers also acted collectively to reduce the proﬁtability of art theft by transforming the norms
and processes of the art market (Klerman & Shortland, 2022).
In the early 1990s, art insurers at Lloyd’s of London co-funded the creation a private database of lost and stolen art from their claims data—the Art Loss Register (ALR). Over time, an ever-increasing proportion of auction
houses and dealers made it part of their due diligence procedure to consult the ALR database. If an object is matched to one reported as stolen, it cannot be bought or sold in good faith. Ideally, dealers and auctioneers
impound the disputed artwork until the claim is resolved (though sometimes they merely reject the consignment). If it is suspected that the original thief or their accomplices are still in the picture, the police are alerted. If
the police are unable to seize the object and apprehend the criminals, they may authorize the ALR to pay a small
reward for its retrieval.3 If a collector has acquired good title through adverse possession, ALR subscribers still
refuse to buy or sell the object until the current owners have compensated the former owners (Shortland, 2021).
Insurers thereby reduced the attractiveness of art theft. First, the ALR’s excellent links with public law enforcement raise the risk of stealing and dealing in stolen art. Second, the expectation of having to settle with former
owners reduces the market value of stolen art. Third, although the ALR provides a channel for re-legitimizing
stolen artworks, protracted negotiations, the risk of exposure, and low compensation payments discourage further
art thefts (Shortland, 2021).
Yet, this is not a purely privately governed insurance market. Governments participate in all three governance
dimensions when it is perceived to be in the public interest. In terms of regulation, artworks declared “national
treasures” or “cultural heritage” receive public protection. Buyers cannot acquire secure property rights, as “cultural heritage” can be reclaimed by the source government indeﬁnitely. These regulations are publicly enforced
by customs: objects crossing state or international borders without the correct paperwork are seized without compensation. Governments also provide police protection for national collections. On the coinsurance dimension,
governments sometimes take on the tail-end risks of major exhibitions through formal indemnity schemes. All
losses from public museums are borne by society. Some governments pay for the retrieval of stolen artworks,
such as the recovery of two Turner paintings on behalf of the Tate Gallery in London in a shady £3.5 million deal
(Nairne, 2012). However, this form of coinsurance can be counterproductive in that it may encourage further art
thefts. Detailed analysis thus shows that at the top end of the market government involvement is pervasive.
Figure 2 reﬂects our assessment of the resulting government involvement in the trophy art insurance market:
medium in the regulatory dimension, reﬂecting the regulations discussed above; medium in the investment
dimension, reﬂecting government enforcement and government ownership of some museums and their collections; and medium in the co-insurance dimension, reﬂecting the explicit government insurance for the risks of
major exhibitions.
By comparison, we classify the government involvement in the mid-market art insurance markets as low on
each of these dimensions: for government regulation there is only the ordinary tort law standard of care and general criminal law, for government investment there is only the access to courts and ordinary criminal law enforcement, and for government co-insurance there is only the general guaranty funds that (partially) backstop
insolvent insurance companies.

3.2. Terrorism insurance for commercial property
Like natural catastrophes, terrorism risks are relatively rare but can cause ruinous losses. Unlike natural catastrophes, however, terrorism is not random but targeted and timed to cause maximum economic and psychological
damage. This complicates insurers’ ability to calculate premium and spread risks. For example, exposure is highly
concentrated in the commercial centers of major cities. A major terrorist attack in any metropolis could bankrupt
© 2022 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.

5

17485991, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12505 by University Of Pennsylvania, Wiley Online Library on [19/12/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

THE GOVERNMENT BEHIND INSURANCE GOVERNANCE

THE GOVERNMENT BEHIND INSURANCE GOVERNANCE
Regulaon

Trophy Art

High

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

High

Coinsurance

Medium
High

Public investment

FIGURE 2 Government support for art insurance

some insurers, so terrorism insurance relies on the availability of (affordable) reinsurance. When terrorist activity
escalates or terrorists change their tactics, reinsurers may (temporarily) withdraw from the market as they learn
to evaluate the new risks. For example, in the early 1990s the Irish Republican Army mounted a bombing campaign in the United Kingdom. When a bomb detonated in London’s ﬁnancial district in April 1992, it caused
hundreds of millions of pounds in damages. Unable to assess their exposure under the enhanced threat,
European and British reinsurers announced that they would withdraw terrorism cover from reinsurance contracts
as of January 1993. Direct insurers reacted by excluding terrorism risks from property insurance, fueling fears of
collapsing property prices triggering an economic crisis (Bice, 1994).
The British government thus set up Pool Reinsurance: a mutual reinsurance company for terrorism property
risks drawn from the membership of the Association of British Insurers backed by a government guarantee. After
the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, the United States and many European
governments followed suit with similar schemes (ECB, 2007; US Congress, 2002). The aim is always to support
rather than replace private insurance markets, so governments generally assume responsibility for extreme tail
risks only. Above a set threshold, liabilities are shared between the public and private sector or covered entirely
by the government. To protect the tax-payer interest, governments create means to recoup (at least some of) their
assistance payments. For example, beneﬁciaries may have to repay emergency loans, or governments may levy a
surcharge on a wide range of insurance policies after an event (Kuhnreuter, 2019). Figure 3 reﬂects our assessment of the resulting government involvement in the terrorism risks aspect of the commercial property insurance
market: low in the regulatory dimension, reﬂecting a decision to support private security standards; medium in
the investment dimension, reﬂecting the availability of government security grants for private organizations and
government efforts to identify and interdict terrorism; and medium in the co-insurance dimension, reﬂecting
explicit government insurance but only for the extreme tail of terrorism losses.
Notably, the experience of government-backed terrorism insurance raises the question whether terrorism risk
is in fact uninsurable. By 2021, Pool Reinsurance had built up £6.5billion in reserves and never called for treasury
support to cover more than £1.25billion in claims.4 Jaffee and Russell (2007) point out that while catastrophic terrorism losses remain a possibility and risks cannot be precisely estimated, major natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes share these properties. Ambiguity can be priced, and ambiguity aversion compensated.
The natural disaster insurance market in the United States regularly absorbs losses exceeding the uniquely high
cost of the September 11 attacks. However, once a government-backed scheme is implemented its beneﬁciaries
tend to lobby for its continuation. Although the US Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 was originally intended
as a three-year scheme it was renewed in 2005, 2007, 2015, and 2019, with the next review scheduled for 2027.
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Even if government lending facilities are not called upon, co-insurance is not costless: it distorts incentives for
self-protection. Under a private regime, insurance premia for real estate in the highest risk locations would rise,
encouraging ﬁrms to diversify into lower risk areas and take additional precautions. Such adjustments leave the
economy more resilient to future attacks (Jaffee, 2005). Kuhnreuter (2019), therefore, suggests that the US government should be more proactive in encouraging commercial enterprises to invest in risk reduction. Governments could also tighten security standards through regulation, but so far, such initiatives have largely been
conﬁned to civil aviation. Thus, while explicit co-insurance addresses the (perceived) problem of non-insurability
it creates second-order problems that governments may be called upon to ﬁx. The footprint of government in the
insurance market may thus grow continuously, beyond whatever underlying need may remain.

3.3. Kidnap for ransom insurance
K&R insurance sold to corporations engaged in international commerce can be seen as a poster child of private
governance (Shortland, 2017). It has existed since the 1930s, is widely available, and facilitates foreign direct
investment, oil and mineral extraction, aid delivery, research, and reporting in areas of limited statehood. K&R
insurance is conditional on customers obtaining and following security advice appropriate to the threat level. This
makes the insureds hard targets and transnational kidnaps extremely rare. If they occur, K&R insurers have created strong norms and procedures for how they should be resolved. Safeguarding the life and health of hostages
has topmost priority, but the resolution protocol frustrates kidnappers’ ambition to make a quick proﬁt from
abductions. Tough and slow bargaining—led by professional negotiators—discourages opportunistic kidnapping
and puts downward pressure on ransoms. By raising the risks and lowering the rewards of kidnapping, the criminal threat is reduced for all (Shortland, 2017).
The key to preventing an erosion of safety standards and the bargaining protocol is that K&R insurers do not
compete on the rules underpinning the market. Almost all K&R insurance is written or reinsured in the Lloyd’s
market in London (Shortland, 2019). Circa 20 insurance companies in the market, led by three to four dominant
syndicates, govern themselves informally as a club. Its members jointly create the common good of market order by
sharing information and adhering to the club’s rules and norms (Stringham, 2015). If kidnaps or ransoms rise, this
indicates that a member or their subcontractors may have made mistakes, or that criminals have innovated. Remedies are discussed and explored within the tightly interlinked underwriting, security consultancy, and crisis response
communities. Lloyd’s clear and effective rules for ending club membership ensure compliance (Shortland, 2019).
The involvement of governments is subtle but essential in the provision of K&R insurance. First, in the regulation domain K&R insurers rely on ﬁrms’ legal “duty of care” toward their employees. This justiﬁes paying
© 2022 The Authors. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.
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FIGURE 4 Government support for K&R insurance

(limited) ransoms to retrieve kidnapped staff. The legal duty of care also enables hostages and their families to
sue employers that took shortcuts in safeguarding staff or bungled ransom negotiations. The track record of K&R
insurers’ crisis responders in retrieving hostages and the liability risk arising from failing to obtain or ignoring
ﬁrst-class security or negotiation advice makes K&R insurance highly advisable. This reduces the ability of companies to negotiate on conditionality or engage in moral hazard behavior once insurance is obtained. Second, the
security consultancies retained by K&R insurers sometimes negotiate deals with host governments to bolster protection for their customers such as police or military guards around their customers’ installations. Third, Lloyd’s
insurers can act collectively to encourage governments to provide additional resources for law enforcement.
When the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee threatens to list an area as having an “enhanced risk” or a “war risk”
affected companies lobby governments to enhance security. When K&R insurers advise their customers to evacuate a location, host governments generally act swiftly to restore order to maintain economic activity and tax
income. Thus, while the market is largely privately governed, at a more granular level state management of criminal or rebel threats is not uncommon. Figure 4 reﬂects our assessment of the resulting government involvement
in the K&R insurance: low in the regulation dimension reﬂecting the ordinary duty of care standard, low in the
investment dimension reﬂecting the limited and sporadic involvement of government in enforcement efforts, and
very low in the coinsurance dimension, reﬂecting the discretionary, implicit government backstop of Lloyd’s illustrated by the regulatory support of the Lloyd’s Reconstruction and Renewal effort that occurred in the 1990s
when Lloyd’s solvency was at risk (Baker, 2021).
K&R insurance is highly vulnerable to (naïve) outside competition. A good example is hijack for ransom
insurance, which became popular with the rising threat of Somali piracy from 2008. New insurers pushed into
what looked like a lucrative business, competing on the basis that “time is money” while ignoring the problem of
3rd party moral hazard. Initially, ransoms were a small fraction of the cost of having a ship out of action, cargo
delayed and a crew maltreated. Yet, pirates quickly adjusted their ransoms upwards when they met only token
resistance from negotiators. Rising ransoms led to an explosion of piracy: hijacks, ransoms and negotiation
periods escalated. Governments responded with an unprecedented international naval counterpiracy effort—that
nonetheless failed to contain the problem (World Bank, 2013).
Navies thus called on governments and insurers to require better self-protection by ship-owners. The
European Naval Force (EUNavFor) started to collect and publish high quality piracy incident data in real time
and coordinated the development of increasingly stringent Best Management Practice (BMP) protocols for transits of the high-risk area with a wide range of stakeholders.5 As the insurance market contracted sharply, the
remaining insurers made adopting BMP a precondition of insurance. The mixture of public investment (navies)
8
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and standard setting (BMP) eventually succeeded in suppressing the piracy threat. However, the cost of—temporarily—ignoring 3rd party moral hazard led to a permanently higher state footprint in what had previously been
a mostly privately governed insurance market. Accordingly, we classify the government involvement in the hijack
for ransom insurance market as medium in the regulation dimension, medium in the public investment dimension, and low in the co-insurance dimension.
Banning ransom payments is a commonly discussed remedy to kidnap for ransom. It is already in place for
kidnappings by proscribed organizations. Neither families nor ﬁrms may offer a ransom for hostages held by terrorists, crisis responders may not facilitate a payment and insurers cannot reimburse it. Only sovereign governments can decide whether to ransom their citizens, and many do—for exorbitant amounts of money compared
to ransoms paid to criminal kidnappers (Shortland & Keatinge, 2017). Governments that negotiate with terrorists
thus replace private kidnap insurance with (highly costly) public insurance. Making this public insurance sustainable requires public risk reduction measures both on the regulation and the public investment dimensions to fortify the potential targets (e.g., diplomatic staff). Thus, the cost of maintaining a presence in a “terrorist” area is
costly government intervention: at least medium in all three dimensions, if not higher.

3.4. Arctic shipping and marine insurance
As climate change progresses, the Arctic Ocean attracts increasing transit and destination trafﬁc (Sarrabezoles
et al., 2014). The Northwest Passage and the North Sea Route between the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc oceans promise signiﬁcant cost savings for trade between Europe and Asia. The Arctic also holds signiﬁcant deposits of oil,
gas, and minerals (Gautier et al., 2009) and arctic destinations are increasingly popular with cruise ship operators.
There are massive risks associated with shipping in this environmentally fragile and remote area. Harsh sea and
weather conditions, icebergs, pack ice, and underwater navigational hazards are an ever-present danger. Major
incidents could easily overwhelm search and rescue and local health care facilities. Salvage operations are often
delayed, increasing the risk of leakage of fuel or loss of cargo. Liability for environmental pollution, loss of life,
personal injury, or becoming marooned can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars (Saul, 2020). Thus, availability of (affordable) insurance is a key factor in the development of arctic shipping (Sarrabezoles et al., 2014).
Self-protection and loss mitigation are crucial for insurability. Ships’ hulls can be strengthened to withstand
ice impact. Ice-trained helmsmen, additional engine room staff and deck-crew, as well as permanently alert lookouts can prevent accidents and equipment failure. Ships should carry additional fuel, water, food stocks, heaters,
and blasting equipment. Some voyages require icebreaker and ice pilot support (International Chamber of
Shipping, 2019). How do insurers prevent a race to the bottom on these hugely costly security measures? Until
the 1990s, the market for marine (and especially hull) insurance was highly concentrated at Lloyd’s of London.
Conditions for insurance were determined in the Lloyd’s club of underwriters through the Navigating Limits
Sub-committee. Only the most experienced and cautious ship-owners could obtain arctic insurance (Sarrabezoles
et al., 2014). In this era, government intervention was low in all three dimensions.
However, when rising demand was choked off by risk-averse club governance, new competitors entered the
market. Chinese, Scandinavian, and London insurers outside Lloyd’s gained signiﬁcant market shares in hull
insurance in the 2000s. Underwriting practices deteriorated. The Lloyd’s Navigating Limits Sub-committee and
the Lloyd’s Register which had developed and dominated the design, construction, and in-service standards for
“ice class” ships became mere reference points. There were growing concerns that arctic shipping was neither safe
nor environmentally sustainable. Collective action was needed to turn “guidelines,” “advice,” and “recommendations” into binding obligations. Hull insurers, therefore, jointly developed a consensus on desired standards and
information-sharing through the International Union of Maritime Insurers and a 2014 workshop at Lloyd’s
including the Swedish Club, the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, and the Nordic Association of Marine
Insurers. They then lobbied for their preferred standards to be made mandatory though the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Even if ﬂag states do not enforce the rules, ship-owners are compelled
to comply with IMO regulations by port states or as a condition for passage through territorial waters.
The International Union of Maritime Insurers contributed technical knowledge on best practices in arctic
shipping and drafted the amendments to the existing IMO conventions—alongside arctic council members, environmental protection agencies, and ship-owners associations (Arctic Portal, 2016). Insurers succeeded in
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incorporating the concept of “ice classes” and polar training for seafarers into the IMO’s Polar Code. Compliance
with the Polar Code became mandatory for new ships in January 2017 under the conventions of Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) and Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). In addition, arctic shipping data is centrally
collected in the Arctic Shipping Trafﬁc Database (ASTD) improving risk modeling—including that of private
insurers.6
Governments remain involved in all three dimensions, however, particularly in the littoral states. For example,
Russia made a massive public investment in nuclear-powered ice breakers to cut risks for domestic ship-owners.
Russia also mandates that foreign ships meet Russian ice class standards in their territorial waters and hire
(Russian) pilots and icebreakers on the North Sea Route (Moe, 2020). Canada has its own safety and pollution
prevention regulations for arctic shipping, building on the SOLAS and MARPOL regulations. Some governments
sponsor or undertake activities that are too expensive to insure such as arctic exploration and seismic mapping.
The Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO uses the Northern Sea Route for cargo transports
(Humpert, 2019). We consider these latter activities as examples of government intervention in the (co-) insurance dimension. Thus, we ﬁnd that the result of increasing competition between insurers is more enterprise as
well as pervasive government intervention in all three governance dimensions, with the precise levels differing
depending on the location (e.g., Russian territorial waters) or ownership (e.g., COSCO).

3.5. Environmental liability insurance
Liability regimes force companies (and individuals) to take ﬁnancial responsibility for the damage caused by their
actions to their staff, customers, shareholders, the wider public, and the environment. This makes ﬁrms more
cautious, reduces demands for governments to compensate victims, and shifts the ﬁnancial burden of clean-up
operations to the private sector. And, signiﬁcantly for our purposes, liability creates a demand for liability
insurance.
Until the 1970s, general liability insurance policies covered environmental liabilities for bodily injury and
property damage. The standard coverage made insurers liable for insureds’ present liabilities under policies sold
in the (sometimes distant) past. Insurers were, thus, vulnerable to what European insurers refer to as development risk: changes in the liability rules that expose them to greater liability than expected at the time they sold
their policies (Baker, 2002). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US government increased the scale of potential
liability for environmental damage incidents such as marine oil spills. Insurers that had sold this kind of insurance to industrial enterprises were desperate to avoid these new, difﬁcult-to-assess liabilities and, starting in the
1970s, they attempted to eliminate coverage for future gradual pollution by inserting exclusions into their general
liabilities policies. Going forward they only offered new coverage for contamination losses related to explosions
and the like (Abraham, 1988; Horkovich et al., 2012).
Entrepreneurs, primarily based in London, ﬁlled the resulting gap in environmental liabilities insurance by
offering insurance for environmental liabilities on a “claims made” basis. These insurance policies covered claims
ﬁrst made during the policy period, regardless of when the activities that produced those liabilities took place.
Because claims-made insurance is sold (and priced) closer in time to when insureds are held liable, insurers have
greater conﬁdence about the rules and proceedings that govern those liabilities. It soon became clear, however,
that these ﬁrst-generation specialty environmental liability insurers had grossly miscalculated. While the law
governing environmental liabilities may have been reasonably well understood at the time insurers sold the policies, the location and extent of the hazardous waste deposits that gave rise to the liabilities were not. The specialty
environmental liability insurers had sold policies with coverage that was too broad, based on underwriting that
was too superﬁcial, and at prices that were too low (Horkovich et al., 2012). At the same time, the traditional
insurers learned that their new pollution exclusions were vulnerable in court: many US states held that the provisions did not unambiguously exclude liability for gradual pollution (Abraham, 1988). As a result, the insurers
were made to pay for hazardous waste clean-up actions, not only under the legacy policies sold before they
started using pollution exclusions, but also under policies that they had sold since then (Id.). This development
risk was especially troubling for the traditional insurers, because the Superfund laws enacted in Congress in 1980
and separately in many states imposed retroactive, strict liability on companies that had produced or transported
hazardous waste or owned property on which hazardous waste was located (Abraham, 1988).
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The liability insurance crisis that occurred in the middle 1980s provided the insurance industry with the
opportunity for a reset (Abraham, 1988; Baker, 2004). The general liability insurers stopped using their earlier,
weak pollution exclusions and began using stronger exclusions that courts have enforced to bar coverage for environmental liabilities. The ﬁrst-generation specialty environmental liability insurers went out of business and were
replaced by new underwriters who learned from their mistakes. These second-generation specialty environmental
liability insurers sold higher priced, narrower coverage with lower limits to forced buyers: businesses that transported, stored, or otherwise handled hazardous materials and, as a result, had a legal obligation to demonstrate
their ﬁnancial responsibility for liabilities that could arise out of their activities (Horkovich et al., 2012).
Meanwhile, local and state government ofﬁcials realized that the strict hazardous waste liability rules
prevented the redevelopment of former industrial sites. The existing law made every entity in the chain of ownership or occupancy of property—including the redevelopers—liable for the full extent of the clean-up costs. As a
result, banks and other ﬁnancial institutions were unwilling to lend the money needed to redevelop these “brownﬁelds.” The risk was too great that redevelopment would reveal additional contamination, or additional costs of
cleaning up known contamination, making redevelopment non-viable.
The government’s hazardous waste law thus became a pressing political problem. Despite experimentation by
some second-generation environmental liability insurers, the market for site-speciﬁc insurance to cover excess
clean-up costs failed to develop. Not only was it difﬁcult to predict the clean-up costs, but complex legal actions
would be needed to allocate ﬁnancial responsibilities among the potentially responsible parties. Federal and state
environmental protection agencies thus began exploring ways to revise hazardous waste liability law to facilitate
(insurance for) brownﬁeld redevelopment (U.S. House of Representatives, 2001).
This effort resulted in legislation in the early 2000s that provided substantial protection against liability for
clean-up costs to “bona ﬁde prospective purchasers” of contaminated sites. If purchasers demonstrate that they
have taken appropriate steps to (attempt to) contain the contamination at the site, they can obtain formal assurances from the environmental agencies that limit their liability (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2021).
The availability of these legal safe harbors facilitated the growth of a robust market for prospective liability insurance for brownﬁeld redevelopment (Foggan & Gridley, 2014; Horkovich et al., 2012).
Once again, government is deeply involved along all three dimensions. Government regulation shapes policyholder conduct and informs insurer underwriting. Government enforcement of environmental laws creates much
of the liability that stimulates the demand for the insurance. Government enforcement also provides some assurance to the insurance market that companies will comply with modern strict standards and, therefore, be less
likely to contaminate ground and water. Additionally, the government enforcement that creates a brownﬁeld also
creates a technical record that insurers can use in their underwriting for the prospective coverage. Finally, governments bear the tail risk. When the most recent owner of contaminated property becomes insolvent, property
taxes are no longer paid, and the property comes under the control of local government. If the costs of cleaning
up the site exceed what can be recovered from the potentially responsible parties, and if there are no uses for the
site that can motivate investors to fund a cleanup, the property remains contaminated until government provides
the funding through a state or federal cleanup program. The “safe harbor” legislation thus facilitates redevelopment of contaminated sites by protecting brownﬁeld development businesses and, by extension, their insurers
(including government), from tail risk. Accordingly, we classify the government involvement in the environmental liability insurance markets as high in the regulation dimension, high in the enforcement dimension and
medium in the co-insurance dimension.

3.6. Public directors and ofﬁcers liability insurance
Corporate and securities liability law protects the shareholders and creditors of publicly traded companies against
mismanagement. It makes directors and ofﬁcers personally liable for ﬁnancial losses arising from their decisions
with the aim of discouraging managerial fraud, theft, and noncompliance. However, managers become inefﬁciently risk-averse if they fear being sued and punished for honest mistakes and adverse circumstances beyond
their control. Directors and Ofﬁcers (D&O) insurance mitigates this problem by covering the companies’ directors and ofﬁcers for liabilities arising from legally insurable conduct in the course of their duties (Baker &
Grifﬁth, 2010).
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The primary liability covered by public companies’ D&O insurance—securities fraud—has wider scope than
the name suggests. At least in the United States, “everything is securities fraud,” in the immortal words of
Bloomberg’s Matt Levine (Strauss, 2022). Levine’s point was that companies facing crises tend to avoid precipitating them by being less than forthcoming, or downright untruthful, in public statements to shareholders and the
securities authorities. This often leads to securities fraud actions when the crisis erupts. Examples include
Dieselgate, the Marsh bid-rigging scandal, the options backdating scandal, the opioid crisis, and even some cyberattacks and data breaches.7 As a result, securities fraud actions police the violation of corporate governance
norms that go well beyond accounting rules.
Since at least the 1970s, public company securities and corporate liability actions have overwhelmingly been
settled, not litigated to judgment (Alexander, 1991; Baker & Grifﬁth, 2010). Public companies do not have the
taste for lengthy lawsuits with unpredictable, potentially catastrophic outcomes, particularly when they bought
insurance to protect from those lawsuits. This gave rise to two types of moral hazard problems that threatened to
undermine the legitimacy of D&O insurance.
First, in the 1980s, there was a ﬂurry of legal actions that settled for amounts within the limits of the D&O
insurance—seemingly without regard to their merits (Alexander, 1991). This created a perception that D&O
insurance encouraged third party moral hazard. In response, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) in the mid-1990s. The PSLRA increased courts’ ability to eliminate non-meritorious lawsuits, with the goal of restoring the deterrent effect of securities fraud actions and stabilizing the D&O insurance
market (Choi, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007).8 While forcefully opposed by the trial bar (as evidenced by President
Clinton’s veto and Senator Metzenbaum’s objection that the insurance companies were behind the legislation),
the PSLRA arguably preserved the securities litigation “business” by restoring its legitimacy.9
Second, out-of-court settlements in liability actions prevent the judicial ﬁndings of fraud typically required for
the fraud exclusions in the policies to apply. This aggravates insider moral hazard. D&O insurance pays the individual’s defense costs, including for criminal prosecutions. Unless and until there is a ﬁnding of fraud in a civil
action (which almost never occurs because cases settle), the insurer will pay the individual’s civil liability, even if
they were convicted of criminal fraud. To restore the intended deterrent effect of making directors and ofﬁcers
personally liable for willful damages, shareholders in a private action or a securities regulator in a public action
began insisting on a personal payment as a condition of settling the action (Baker & Grifﬁth, 2010).
As in the case of environmental liability, D&O insurers avoid tail risk by selling policies with limits that are
far below the potential liability. While there is no explicit government co-insurance, there is implicit co-insurance. This can be seen most obviously in circumstances that motivate a government bailout, such as the Savings &
Loan crisis in the United States and the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, but other forms of implicit government co-insurance
are so routine that they can easily be missed (Moss, 2004). Limited liability protects shareholders from tail risk:
the worst that can happen to shareholders is that the value of their shares goes to zero. Bankruptcy protects other
constituents of the corporation from (some of the) tail risk. If the corporation has positive net worth without its
current liabilities, the corporation can be reorganized to preserve the ongoing business under new ownership and
pay the creditors as much or more than they would obtain in a liquidation. Like the brownﬁeld redevelopment
safe harbors observed in the environmental liability case study, limited liability and bankruptcy can thus be
understood as a form of government co-insurance.
Government is even more deeply involved along the regulation and investment dimensions. Government regulation
sets the standards that guide corporate conduct and provide the basis for insured liabilities. The government role in
enforcement includes not only civil enforcement actions by securities regulators and criminal enforcement by prosecutors, but also the institutional framework for the extensive private enforcement that takes place through civil litigation.
Accordingly, we classify government involvement in the D&O insurance market as high in the regulation dimension,
high in the investment dimension, and, while not as high in the co-insurance dimension as in the environmental liability insurance market, nevertheless higher than the very low levels in the ordinary art and K&R insurance markets.
4. Analysis
Table 1 summarizes how we classify each of the six cases studies and the variations within them. We observe pervasive involvement of government in private insurance markets that extends well beyond the activities
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TABLE 1 Government support for various insurance regimes

Art theft
Mid-market
Trophy art
Terrorism
Aviation
Commercial prop.
Kidnap & Hijack
K&R
Hijack for ransom
Arctic shipping
Lloyd’s club
Competitive
Environ. liability
D&O liability

Regulation

Investment

Co-insurance

Low
Medium

Low
Medium

Low
Medium

High
Medium

Medium
Medium

High
Medium

Low
Medium

Low
Medium

Low
Low

Low
Medium
High
Medium

Low
Medium
High
Medium

Low
Medium
Medium
Low/Medium

traditionally understood as insurance regulation, such as the solvency and market conduct regulation of insurance
companies. We do not contend that governments always undertake these activities for the purpose of maintaining
sustainable insurance markets, but insurers do engage with governments for that purpose. Put another way, our
three-dimensional model describes how governments attempt to achieve a better balance of social risk and enterprise. Sometimes this occurs in conscious coordination with insurance markets, while other times this happens in
ways that government actors do not explicitly connect to insurance markets. We note the diversity and the evolutionary nature of that involvement along the three governance dimensions we explored. Along the co-insurance
dimension, governments can explicitly insure a share of the loss (most usefully the tail risk), as in the case of terrorism and high-end art theft. Alternatively, governments can implicitly insure the tail risk, either by bearing that
risk themselves, as in the case of environmental harm, terrorist hostage taking, and the systemic consequences of
corporate misconduct, or by protecting private actors from risk in other ways, as in the case of the brownﬁeld
safe harbors, limited shareholder liability, and bankruptcy reorganizations. Finally, governments can directly bear
the risk by owning the entities facing the loss, as in the case of the Chinese arctic vessels that compete with private vessels.
Along the regulation dimension, information is key to good governance, public or private. Small insurance
markets such as K&R and art loss have created private channels for information exchange. In highly competitive
markets, however, insurers may withhold information. Mandating central data collection and making information
publicly available can improve private decision making—as in the piracy and arctic case studies. In some cases,
governments go further and develop regulatory standards, as illustrated in the arctic, environmental liability and
D&O insurance case studies. In other cases, governments act indirectly by recognizing a legal duty of care that
makes good practices mandatory because of the possibility of civil liability for breach of that duty, as illustrated
in the K&R and piracy insurance case studies.
Governments can also act directly and indirectly along the public investment dimension. Governments can
directly invest in loss reduction measures, as illustrated by the K&R, arctic shipping, piracy, and terrorism insurance case studies. Governments can invest directly in enforcement actions to enforce standards set through regulation, as illustrated by the environmental liability and D&O insurance case studies. Governments can invest
indirectly by maintaining courts that allow private causes of action that enforce speciﬁc government standards as
well as the more general duty of care. Other forms of government investment in risk reduction include infrastructure investment to discourage attackers from key targets (such as bollards, metal detectors, and barriers), the icebreakers and pilot boats in the arctic, and enhanced security in museums.
The liability insurance case studies introduced an important lever that governments can use across all three
dimensions: liability rules and procedures. If recruiting the loss management capacity of the insurance market is
one of the objectives of a liability regime, as has been suggested for certain cyber liabilities (Cooper &
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Kobayashi, 2022), state actors may adjust the liability rules to better serve that function. Even if recruiting the loss
management capacity of the insurance market plays no part in the initial formation of the liability regime, the
interaction of that regime with the insurance market may nevertheless lead state actors to adjust the liability rules,
as illustrated in the environmental liability and D&O case studies.
Liability rule adjustments can have consequences along all three dimensions. Along the regulation dimension,
liability can be adjusted to change the rules or standards governing the insureds or third parties’ conduct. The
objective of tightening liability standards is to reduce the tail risk of the future. However, it can have the paradoxical effect of increasing insurers’ losses in the short run because tighter standards may lead to more liability for
past actions that are subject to the new, higher standards. Along the enforcement dimension, liability regimes can
be adjusted to increase or decrease private threat reduction efforts. There can be government enforcement, with
larger or smaller budgets and greater or lesser forbearance, or no government enforcement at all, other than that
of the courts in adjudicating private enforcement actions. Private enforcement regimes can include bigger inducements to bring legal actions, with levers such as multiple damages, success-based fees for lawyers, and the ability
to aggregate many small claims into one big action. Finally, along the co-insurance dimension, governments generally do not take on the tail risk of corporate liabilities explicitly, with workers compensation liability as a major
exception. However, government may be a residual bearer of the underlying losses that the liability regime seeks
to address, and governments create and maintain legal rules that protect private actors from tail risk. These legal
rules can function as a kind of insurance, especially when government bears the tail risk (Moss, 2004).
In addition to highlighting the role of government, the case studies also illustrate the ability of private insurers
to develop effective risk mitigation protocols and adapt them to changing threats. Insurers can be highly effective
in setting standards for the insured in specialist insurance markets that are small enough to operate as clubs.
However, club governance can fail when demand for insurance grows rapidly, and outsiders compete for market
share by undercutting the club’s conditions. Insurers also have created effective institutions to reduce the proﬁtability of crime (Baker & Shortland, 2022b). However, when these protocols privilege the long-run interest of the
club (and society) over the short-term interest of the insureds, they are vulnerable to outside competitors that
seemingly offer a “better” deal. In some cases, insurers proved effective at sharing information. This is done at
low cost in small clubs but requires more intricate design and perhaps public support for bigger groups. Finally,
we note that several mature insurance markets were at one stage considered “uninsurable.” In some cases, private
solutions were found: especially in small markets, clubs formed to collect information, set standards and ﬁght
threats. Once new threats were understood and mitigated, private (re)insurance became available again. However,
in major insurance markets there can be pressure for governments to intervene. That intervention can promote
or inhibit the evolutionary process.
5. What future(s) for ransomware insurance?
Cyber-insurance has been available since the mid-1990s and was initially governed privately (Wolff, 2022), subject only to ordinary solvency and market conduct insurance regulation. K&R insurers at Lloyd’s of London were
among the ﬁrst to insure against cyber extortion with governance efforts focused on containing the crime. Yet,
US liability insurers developed a competing product for the US market that insured against cyber extortion as
well as the liability risks that were prominent in the United States, but not in Europe (Baker &
Shortland, 2022a).10 Divergent legal regimes thus prevented the formation of a cohesive private governance
regime for ransomware when the market was still small enough to facilitate a club-based solution. Demand has
grown rapidly in recent years: the cyber insurance market grew from US$2.02bn in 2015, to US$7.01bn in 2020,
with projections of more than US$20bn by 2025 (Globaldata, 2021). For comparison, the gross annual premium
in K&R insurance is in the region of US$ 250–300 mn per annum (Spross, 2019) and environmental liability
insurance stood at US$ 1.51bn in 2019 (Insurance Newsnet, 2021). Intense competition has prevented the formation of an industry consensus on minimum underwriting standards. Recent attacks on infrastructure (Colonial)
and service providers (Kaseya) indicate that there are systemic risks and extreme loss scenarios, and the specter
of non-insurability has been raised (Abraham & Schwarcz, 2021; Pal et al., 2021).
Escalating cybercrime and signiﬁcant losses among cyber insurers in 2019 and 2020 have led some insurers to
withdraw from or reduce their ransomware cover. A concurrent “hard market” for insurance provides both the
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incentive and the opportunity for product innovation. Insurers that remain in the market are undertaking drastic
remedial action: reducing available limits, increasing prices, and demanding better cyber-hygiene from their customers (Smith, 2021). These dynamics are further re-enforced by reduced availability of reinsurance (Shi, 2021),
which exacerbates the capacity constraint fueling the hard market (Baker, 2004). Current market conditions thus
expedite an essential process of product innovation (Ransomware Task Force, 2021 at 60). At the same time, calls
for government action have already led to intervention along all the three governance dimensions. To consider
the potential futures for cybercrime risks it is, therefore, helpful to consider the present role of government in the
United States and United Kingdom across our three dimensions.
Coinsurance: There is explicit government coinsurance in the United States and United Kingdom only for
extreme tail events that would qualify as terrorism, but governments implicitly bear tail risk from ransomware
attacks with systemic consequences (Abraham & Schwarcz, 2021).
Regulation: There is a wide variety of existing cybersecurity regulation and certiﬁcation. For example, there
are emerging industry-speciﬁc legal standards such as the ﬁnancial services industry standards adopted by the
New York State Department of Financial Services.11 The National Institute of Standards and Technology of the
US Department of Commerce has developed a voluntary framework for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure that could become a de facto legal standard through the operation of ﬁduciary and other legal duties of
care.12 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has become the de facto authority on consumer data protection
with formidable enforcement powers against companies disregarding its basic data security advice
(McGeveran, 2019). Finally, existing regulations at national or state level address data privacy standards and
requirements that are implicated in some cybercrime events (Wolff, 2022).
Public investment: While we cannot comprehensively describe what governments are doing to reduce the risk
of cybercrime, we observe government-funded R&D to help harden targets against criminal attacks, such as the
US Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan. Some governments use law enforcement and
the military to disrupt cybercrime (Lyngaas, 2021). They use civil enforcement actions to enforce regulatory standards. They authorize private enforcement, and maintain the courts that enable private enforcement actions.
Governments also runs cybersecurity education campaigns and provide resources for their implementation.
Yet in 2020/2021 industry insiders identiﬁed a need for signiﬁcant further government involvement along all
three dimensions. For example, the Ransomware Task force (2021) recommended a range of urgent policy priorities. On the regulation dimension, there was a call for using regulation to improve cyber-hygiene, forcing the
adoption of minimum standards, and making reporting of ransom payments mandatory. On the coinsurance
dimension, there were demands to support companies that resolve incidents without paying ransoms and provide
a ﬁnancial backstop for extreme losses (the Cyber Response and Recovery fund). There were multiple proposals
to improve state enforcement, such as (1) ending the impunity of cybercriminals in safe-haven states using diplomacy and military intelligence; (2) deterring extortive cybercrime by making ransomware an investigative and
prosecution priority, and (3) disrupting ransom payments.
In the following sections, we draw on the analysis above to discuss how governments can achieve a better balance of social risk and enterprise without stiﬂing private sector innovation. We address the problems of ﬁrst party
moral hazard, third party moral hazard, and tail risks in turn.

5.1. First party moral hazard
Collective action and information problems have so far prevented insurers from developing common standards.
Although a hard market and higher loss ratios have helped to focus efforts since 2020, the cyber-insurance market is large and still growing. Any club governance solution among primary insurers would likely collapse when
the soft market returns. However, the reinsurance market is highly concentrated and essential to the functioning
of the market. Although there is no evidence that this is happening yet, a combination of the top three or four
reinsurers and Lloyd’s could develop and enforce underwriting standards to improve self-protection of insureds.
Given that reinsurers have “skin in the game” they have a clear incentive to identify efﬁcient standards and risk
reduction activities (Baker & Swedloff, 2013). Indeed, the leading cyber-insurance reinsurer, Munich Re, has
argued that insurers can master ransomware, just as insurers have done “many times in other classes of business”
(Sclafane, 2021).
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Our case studies demonstrated that insurers ﬁnd ingenious solutions to tricky governance problems when
they can share data and discuss their experience in conﬁdence. The creation of CyberAcuView demonstrates the
desire of key cyber insurers to work together on data sharing, standards, coordination with law enforcement and
systemic risks evaluation.13 However, maneuvering for competitive advantage and anti-trust concerns have
inhibited such coordination in the past (Miazad, 2021). Governments could therefore support opportunities for
the industry to develop coordinated solutions. An important ﬁrst step would be the mandatory disclosure of
ransomware attacks and payments to give stakeholders an accurate picture of the threat landscape. The US legislation of March 2022, which requires entities providing critical infrastructure services to report attacks and ransoms is a step in the right direction.14 If a more comprehensive reporting requirement fails to curb social risks,
governments could disseminate emerging best practice by creating cybersecurity certiﬁcations at different levels.
Companies would choose to obtain a suitable security standard (perhaps with compliance monitored by government agencies), and insurers could base their premia on the certiﬁed security level rather than monitoring customers directly.15 Our analysis thus tallies with the Ransomware Task Force (2021) recommendation that states
should primarily help to coordinate insurance industry collaboration.

5.2. Third party moral hazard(s)
We are less convinced that markets can handle the two types of third-party moral hazard we identify. The ﬁrst
emanates from criminals that speciﬁcally target the insured for ransom payments. If insurers pay generously and
quickly, they may exacerbate cybersecurity problems (Logue & Shnidermann, 2022). Indeed, crisis responders
struggle to drive down criminal proﬁts. The high cost of business interruption creates an awkward mismatch
between social and private interests. Unlike real-world kidnappings, where keeping hostages hidden and alive is a
logistical challenge, the costs of delay to cyber-extortionists is minimal unless they exﬁltrate and store many
terabytes of data and, even then, the costs, risks, and complications of delay pale in comparison to that involved
in keeping a high-proﬁle hostage. This makes it difﬁcult to keep ransoms low.
However, it is equally problematic to ban ransoms payments and ransomware insurance. Many attacks target
critical infrastructure, such as health care, water, and energy. With lives and livelihoods at risk, a ransom ban
lacks credibility. Governments would likely step in—and either pay the ransom or permit the victims to do
so. Similarly, some managers might decide that they prefer paying an illegal ransom to bankruptcy. Legal businesses are not well placed to conduct transactions with the economic underworld. Without the know-how of
experienced crisis responders, ransoms would likely escalate while fewer trades would succeed (Shortland &
Keatinge, 2017). The overall effect of a ban is thus questionable: the crime would continue and become more
damaging. Companies that fail after (unresolvable and uninsurable) ransomware incidents would likely lobby for
bail-outs—that is, demand additional government insurance. To control this, governments would have to increase
both regulation (to prevent incidents) and law enforcement against perpetrators and victims of crime. Policing
the victims of crime for illegal ransom payments and noncompliance with regulations will strain public sector
resources and trust in the government.
Governments could more usefully focus on pursuing the perpetrators of cybercrime. Efforts to indict and
extradite cybercriminals and direct action against malware groups, such as those taken by the US military in
response to the Colonial Pipeline incident, change the incentives of criminals (e.g., Lyngaas, 2021). Governments
could also make ransom payments less secure for criminals by promoting research on de-anonymizing cryptocurrency transactions and taking other efforts to trace crypto payments, efforts we believe are already under way
in the ﬁght against money laundering.
Perhaps ironically, the second type of third-party moral hazard is facilitated by the privacy regulation that
was enacted to protect individuals from criminal threats to privacy or data integrity. Cybercriminals have recently
weaponized that regulation to achieve the opposite of what it was intended to achieve. They exﬁltrate and
threaten to publicly release data if the company does not pay a ransom (Greisiger, 2019; Verstraete &
Zarsky, 2021). Moreover, because of the threat of civil liability for violating privacy regulation, companies are
cloaking details of cybercrimes, their responses, and the conditions that created the opportunity for the crime
under attorney client privilege and work product immunity. This inhibits government and other efforts to aggregate information about and learn from cyberattacks (Woods & Böhme, 2021).
16
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These unintended consequences could be addressed, just as they were with environmental liability for brownﬁeld redevelopment. Any reform requires deep reﬂection on the objectives of the data privacy regime. Do we still
need punitive remedies to force companies to safeguard their customers’ data when cybersecurity is already at or
near the top of every board’s priority list? Would it be enough for the private sector to bear only the actual damage caused to customers, suppliers, or others by data breaches? (And what, exactly, is that actual damage?)
Increasingly sophisticated cybercrimes (such as the Kaseya attack) mean that even cautious and well-prepared
companies may be breached. Can we tell the difference between bad luck and negligence in practice
(Verstraete & Zarsky, 2021)? As the D&O case study showed, when class actions settle out of court, culpability
can become irrelevant. It is hard to see the justiﬁcation for punishing mere bad luck. Data breach legislation
could also be amended to create a “safe harbor” from liability when a cyber-extortionist releases data in retaliation for a company’s refusal to pay ransom, provided that the company notiﬁes law enforcement of breach and
cooperates with law enforcement in responding to the ransom demand.

5.3. Tail risks
There have been repeated calls for the creation of a public backstop for extreme tail risks, especially for statesponsored cybercrime (Abraham & Schwarcz, 2021; Cunningham & Talesh, 2021; Government Accountability
Ofﬁce, 2022; Pal et al., 2021). At the same time, insurers are drafting new, tighter war-risk provisions for their
cyber insurance policies that are designed to avoid coverage for state-sponsored activity (Carter & Enoizi, 2020;
Lloyd’s Market Association, 2021). Munich Re, the leading cyber reinsurer, advocates a backstop for statesponsored activity (Sclafane, 2021) and some in the US insurance industry are supporting a broader proposal
under consideration in the US Congress. Notably, there is not yet a consensus on the need for a backstop, as indicated by the Ransomware Taskforce leaving this reform off their list. We noted in the Pool Re example in the
United Kingdom and the TRIA example in the United States that explicit government guarantees inhibited innovation in the immature and rapidly growing terrorism insurance market.
The current arrangement is effectively an implicit backstop (the criteria for intervention due to terrorist or
state-sponsored activity being suitably vague). This leaves signiﬁcant opportunity for private sector innovation
and buys time for (re-) insurers to learn about the scale of the risk and how much of this the market can handle.
Unless cyber insurers implement the new state-sponsored activity exclusions or abandon signiﬁcant parts of the
market, there is quite unlikely to be a strong push for an explicit public backstop. Until this time a “wait and see”
attitude with an implicit backstop appears to be a viable policy stance.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have described and then applied a new framework for analyzing the role of government in
maintaining private insurance markets. This framework highlights government activities that go well beyond the
tools of traditional insurance regulation. While not all those broader government activities may be undertaken
for the purpose of maintaining insurance markets, they nevertheless serve that function. Moreover, government
activity that began for reasons that had little or nothing to do with insurance markets can be adapted or ﬁnetuned for that purpose, as we saw in the case of the amendments to US environmental laws that created the safe
harbor component of the brownﬁeld redevelopment program.
Because governments are so involved in so many ways in maintaining insurance markets, it seems inevitable
that private insurance organizations will engage with governments to guide them in that process. Some of those
efforts likely will involve attempts to obtain inefﬁcient or unjust beneﬁts for insurers, but that is not necessarily
the case. Well-functioning private insurance markets provide substantial beneﬁts to the people and organizations
that depend on the risk transfer and spreading the markets provide. Thus, collective efforts by insurers to prod
governments into acting along our three dimensions can plausibly claim to be serving the public interest. In that
regard insurance organizations can be understood to be petitioning the government on behalf of their insureds.
That petitioning represents a new aspect of insurance as governance to be added to the aspects described previously in the literature.
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Whatever the future holds for insurance against ransomware attacks, we are conﬁdent that it will be a publicprivate partnership. We expect the cyber insurance market to continue its path of evolutionary competition, constantly adapting its protocols to changing threats, opportunities, and prohibitions. Governments will steer this
process through co-insurance, regulation, and/or public investment. Our case studies of public-private governance
in tricky insurance markets show that designing interventions is not a one-shot game but a slow and often clunky
process of trial and error.
In times of a perceived crisis, insurance may be in short supply making it politically tempting for governments to provide explicit co-insurance. Yet, our analysis suggests that hard markets are crucial for weeding out
poor underwriting and developing better practices. If hard markets are reframed as opportunities for evolutionary
competition and institution-building, it will be easier to resist urgent calls for government backstops. If coinsurance is vital in the short-term, ad-hoc and informal arrangements avoid creating dependencies and inhibiting
subsequent innovation.
When governments consider implementing new regulations on ransomware, they should be mindful that any
industry consensus on best practice is a momentary snapshot subject to constant review (Anderson &
Fuloria, 2009). Best practice enshrined in law runs risks becoming outdated, ineffective, or even counterproductive. Sometimes legislation turns out to be too strict, choking off desirable economic activity (such as brownﬁeld
development). Some regulation and enforcement can be evaded by moving activities elsewhere or by sidestepping
formal governance in the name of efﬁciency (such as corporate and securities liability). Laws can also be abused
by criminals to increase their own proﬁts (data privacy and the ban on ransom payments to terrorists). We would
therefore recommend that governments routinely examine whether legislation truly serves the public interest. As
discussed above, we are concerned about the punitive nature of at least some aspects of privacy law. Governments
could also do more to help the private sector to develop timely solutions, by collecting and sharing information
about ransomware attacks.
Finally, criminals respond to incentives: namely the proﬁtability of crime, the probability of being caught and
convicted, and the severity of sanctions. Stakeholders will eventually develop protocols to reduce the success rate
and proﬁtability of ransomware. However, to decisively turn the tide on this aspect of cybercrime we likely need
more public law enforcement. Only governments can end the impunity of cybercriminals sheltering in foreign
jurisdictions.
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Endnotes
1

There are also completely private markets for setting and certifying standards in which multiple companies or organizations compete, see, for example, the “grades,” “levels,” or “belts” certifying achievements in music, drama, or sports.

2

See website at https://www.ukﬁnance.org.uk/dedicated-card-and-payment-crime-unit.

3

Initially on behalf of the insurer, who then offers the recovered object back to the former owner in return for the
insured sum.

4

PoolRe website at https://www.poolre.co.uk/reinsurance/.

5

See, for example, BMP 5 available on the EUNavFor website https://eunavfor.eu/mission.

6

Website for ASTD available here: https://www.pame.is/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/astd.
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7

Examples of securities class actions based on these and other corporate disasters can be found through the Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics database and Kevin LaCroix’s D&O Diary blog.

8

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commers
House of Representative, 103rd Congress 2nd Session (July 22, 1994) at 67 (statement by Rep. Tauzin).

9

Id at p. 28 (statement by Senator Metzenbaum).

10

Data protection regulation across the EU was tightened only in 2018.

11

See DFS website at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/cybersecurity.

12

See NIST website at https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.

13

See website at https://cyberacuview.com.

14

See website at https://www.cisa.gov/circia.

15

Anderson and Fuloria (2009) caution that certiﬁcation may create a false sense of security.
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